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Potter: Mark-To-Market Taxation As The Way To Save The Income Tax—A Forme

MARK-TO-MARKET TAXATION AS THE WAY
TO SAVE THE INCOME TAX-A FORMER
ADMINISTRATOR'S VIEW
Clarissa Potter*
The tax world is preoccupied with the abuse of financial products.
Every day Wall Street (and increasingly, main street) comes up with a
new way to exploit the flaws in the tax law to drain money from the U.S.
Treasury.1 The evolution of tax "engineered" financial products is a
source of much anxiety for policymakers and academics.
The biggest problem in responding to tax-engineered financial
products is that our current tax system does not measure income or loss
from capital accurately.
We rely on realization to determine the
measurement and timing of income. Realization is the idea that an
asset's appreciation should not be taxed until the asset is sold or
disposed of, regardless of when the appreciation occurs. The realization
requirement is faulted for lacking economic substance and generating
arbitrary results.
It is said to be a major source of unfairness,
inefficiency, and complexity in our tax system.
Some believe that taxing unrealized income is an intractable
problem for the current tax system, an "Achilles heel," 2 so to speak. This
is one of the arguments in favor of replacing the income tax with a
different system. Since a consumption tax does not impose tax on
income from capital, it necessitates no realization concept. 3 So one
solution to tax-engineered financial products is radical reform: replace
4
the income tax with a flat tax or retail sales tax.
But others believe that more moderate reform is in order. In the
1997 Laurence Woodworth Memorial Lecture, Professor Halperin
Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
See Anita Raghavan & Jacob Schlesinger, Cat and Mouse: Wall Street Concocts New TaxSaving Ploy; Then It's Feds' Turn, WALL ST. J., Nov. 6, 1997, at Al, for one description of how
tax-engineered financial products develop and how government responds.
2 See William D. Andrews, The Achilles' Heel of the Comprehensive Income Tax, in NEW
DmEcrIoNs IN FEDERAL TAX Poucy FOR THE 1980S 278, 280 (Charles E. Walker & Mark A.
Bloomfield eds., 1983).
3 See id. at 283.
4See Joseph Bankman, The New Market in CorporateTax Shelters, TAX NOTES, June 21, 1999, at
1775,1785 (describing this as a -nihilist" view).
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highlighted the challenge presented by tax-engineered financial
products. "The growth of modem financial products has dramatically
increased.. .the difficulty of maintaining the semblance of income
taxation. As the sophistication and spread of the use of financial
products increases, as it most certainly will, the situation can only get
worse.' 5 His prescription was not to abandon the taxation of income
from capital, however, but to make it simpler, fairer, and more efficient.
In particular, Professor Halperin advocates a partial mark-to-market
regime for measuring income that should be subject to tax. A mark-tomarket method requires the taxpayer to ascertain the values of his assets
(and liabilities) at the beginning and end of the relevant period, and treat
the difference as income or loss.
This method allows for the
measurement of income and loss over time more in line with the way
they accrue economically. But a pure mark-to-market regime for
measuring all economic gain or loss, regardless of its source, would
present overwhelming administrative problems. By contrast, the more
pragmatic approach advocated by Professor Halperin would retain a
limited realization requirement when the administrative benefits of
realization are large, and use a mark-to-market method for measuring
gains and losses when valuation and liquidity problems of such an
6
approach are manageable.
First and foremost, implementation of a partial mark-to-market
system would require definition of the base-the assets and liabilities for
which taxpayers would use mark-to-market to calculate income.
Publicly traded stocks and securities, and derivatives 7 based on publicly
traded stocks and securities, are prime candidates. 8 Defining the base to

5Daniel Halperin, Saving the Income Tax: An Agenda for Research, TAX NOTES, Nov. 24, 1997,
at 967,971.
6 See David A. Weisbach, A Partial Mark-to-Market Tax System, 53 TAX L. REv. 95, 103-5

(1999).
7 A derivative is a contractual arrangement that provides payments based on or derived
from changes in the value of other property, payments on the other property, or marketbased rates. For example, the payments under an interest rate swap derive from rates of
interest or yields on U.S. Treasury securities or other debt instruments. Under the tax law,
derivatives of stock and securities are often referred to as "positions" in property. See, e.g.,
I.R.C. §1092(d)(2) (defining position in personal property under the straddle rules, which
disallow a deduction for realized losses to the extent of unrealized gains in offsetting
positions in personal property); I.R.C. §1259(b)(3) (defining position for purposes of the
constructive sale rules, which require a taxpayer to realize a gain if the taxpayer engages in
the economic equivalent of a sale of an appreciated asset by entering into certain offsetting
financial transactions).
8 See Halperin, supra note 5, at 971.
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include at least these instruments, it is argued, would improve the
measurement of taxpayers' income from financial products and would
help resolve the government's battle to limit the use of tax-engineered
products. Since this conflict generates a stream of increasingly complex
rules, taxing income from financial positions under a mark-to-market
regime could also result in significant rule simplification. 9
But, Professor Halperin acknowledges, there would be many
practical problems to work out before this kind of reform could become a
reality. 10 So he challenged his audience to work together to develop a
proposal that could be adopted."
As a former tax administrator, I am somewhat skeptical about
whether a partial mark-to-market approach could be enacted in the near
future. There are a number of reasons for my pessimism. First, the base
to which mark-to-market should apply may be more difficult to define
than many realize. Second, valuing the financial positions included in
even a narrowly-drawn base may prove an overwhelming problem for
taxpayers and the Internal Revenue Service. Finally, regardless of how
much such a system would improve fairness and efficiency and reduce
complexity, it may not be able to garner political support if it is applied
to individuals.
This piece is not intended to be an exhaustive treatment of the
subject. Rather, it provides the impressions of someone who has been
immersed in the current tax policymaking environment. To that end,
this piece will review the problems with the realization rules and how
adopting a partial mark-to-market system might address them. I will
then discuss the problems with defining the base and valuing the
positions included in that base under even the most simple conception of
a partial mark-to-market system. Finally, I will offer my observations
about why I think a partial mark-to-market system would be politically
unsalable despite the best arguments of tax experts. But, lest anyone
think I am too pessimistic, I believe that the current political concern
with the use of tax-engineered financial instruments in corporate tax
shelters creates an opportunity to enact a more limited, but still useful
version of mark-to-market.

9 See id.
10Professor Halperin also proposed as intrinsic elements of his plan that certain assets be
indexed for inflation and that the corporate tax be eliminated for publicly traded
corporations. See id. at 968.
11See id.
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I.

REALIZATION VERSUS MARK-TO-MARKET ACCOUNTING

The classic definition of income is the sum of an individual's
consumption plus his change in wealth during the relevant measurement
period. 12 Under an ideal income tax, a taxpayer would be required to
measure the change in his wealth over the taxable year and include in
income, or claim as a deduction, the amount of the change plus any cash
the taxpayer received.
A taxpayer's gains and losses under the federal income tax,
however, have little to do with changes in the taxpayer's wealth for the
taxable year. Rather, the timing of income and deduction under our
system is largely governed by the realization principle, which defers the
taxation of gain or loss until it is "realized" by the taxpayer. Realization
depends on the occurrence of an event or transaction appropriate for
levying tax. 13 The paradigm realization event is a sale.
Realization cannot be generalized into a coherent principal of
income. It is thought by many to be, at best, a rule of administrative
convenience. 14 There are two administrative problems that realization is
thought to address. First, assets (and liabilities) can be difficult to value.
Therefore, taxing income from capital as it accrues economically (based
on measuring the change in values of assets and liabilities) would
impose significant administrative costs. Second, taxpayers who are
taxed on changes in value might not have sufficient cash with which to
pay the tax. Realization should remedy these problems by "providing
the taxpayer with both a clear measure of gain or loss and the means of
5
paying tax."'
But concerns about valuation and liquidity do not fully explain the
contours of the realization requirement. Realization generally applies

This is often referred to as the Haig-Simons definition of income. See HENRY C..SIMONs,
PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938); Robert M. Haig, The Concepts of Income-Economic
and Legal Aspects, in THE FEDERAL INcoME TAX 1 (Robert M. Haig ed., 1921), reprinted in
READINGS IN THE EcONOMICS OF TAXATION (Richard A. Musgrave & Carl S. Shoup eds.,
12

1959).
13See Daniel N. Shaviro, An Efficiency Analysis of Realization and Recognition Rules Under the
FederalIncome Tax, 48 TAX L. REV. 1, 11 (1992).
14 See id. at 11. See David M. Schizer, Realization as Subsidy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1549, 1551
(1998) for a brief survey of academics' views on the purpose and function of the realization
requirement. Professor Schizer, contrary to the vast majority of scholars, argues that

realization may not be just a rule of convenience, but may also be an effective subsidy for
savings. Id. at 1552.
15Shaviro, supra note 13, at 13.
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even if an asset is easy to value without a sale and even if the asset is
highly liquid. Conversely, transactions are often treated as sales or
dispositions (and thereby as triggering realization) even if the
transactions provide no information on the money value of the assets
involved and no liquidity in the form of cash or liquid assets.16 One
must conclude that other forces have come into play in shaping the way
the realization principle is used to measure income.
Because realization is unrelated to economic gain or loss, using it to
invoke the measurement of gain or loss for tax purposes is inherently
arbitrary. It necessitates drawing arbitrary lines between economically
similar transactions, treating one taxpayer as having sold assets while
treating a similarly situated taxpayer as continuing to hold. Realization
generally depends on actions taken by the taxpayer, so it is largely
within the taxpayer's control. In addition, the formalism with which
courts and tax administrators have approached the realization
requirement makes the cost of triggering realization relatively low, at
least for certain types of assets. These factors often combine to allow a
taxpayer to trigger realization without changing the economic
characteristics of her assets and liabilities. So, theoretically at least,
taxpayers can realize losses virtually at will. Conversely, these factors
allow a taxpayer to make substantial changes in the economic
characteristics of her assets and liabilities without engaging in a sale or
disposition. Thus, theoretically, taxpayers can also avoid realizing gains
17
entirely.
The arbitrariness of the distinction between events that trigger
realization and those that do not, combined with the control taxpayers
have over whether they are treated as holding or selling, systematically
reduces the tax rate on income from wealth. Professor Shuldiner has
described three mechanisms by which this occurs. 18 Imagine that a
taxpayer anticipates earning income from an asset due simply to the
passage of time. First, the realization requirement allows the taxpayer to
defer tax on that anticipated gain. 19 Second, if the value of the asset

16See id.

VAn individual who dies holding appreciated property does not pay tax on the gain, and
his heirs generally receive a step-up in basis to fair market value under I.RLC. §1014(a)(1).
This allows some gains to escape income tax entirely.
Is See Reed Shuldiner, A General Approach to the Taxation of FinancialInstruments, 71 TEX. L.

REv. 243 (1992).

19See id. at 250-53. Professor Shuldiner refers to this as anticipated deferral. See id. As an
example, he describes an arrangement under which "Diva" pays "David" $100 today, and
David promises to pay Diva $121 in two years. See id. He shows that even if the facts are
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declines because, for example, interest rates rise, the taxpayer can obtain
a tax benefit by realizing the loss immediately. But if the value of the
asset increases because, for example, interest rates decline, she can avoid
realizing the gain and thereby defer tax. This is called the "timing
option." 20 Third, the taxpayer can turn the potential benefit from the
timing option into a certainty by placing herself on both sides of a
transaction. One side of this "straddle" will always produce losses that
can be realized for tax purposes, while the other side will produce gains
that can be deferred. 21 To do this in the prior example, the taxpayer
would acquire the appreciating asset and would sell, or "short," the asset
as well. 22
These effects of realization have unfortunate policy implications.
Unfairness is a major byproduct: taxpayers who have similar amounts of
income may be taxed at different effective rates depending on whether
their income can be deferred and whether they can take advantage of the
timing option or the straddle technique. 23 For example, if two
individuals earn identical amounts of economic income in a year and are
subject to the same nomin4l rate of tax, but one earns income in the form
of wages while the other earns income in the form of capital
appreciation, the second individual can enjoy a lower effective tax rate
altered so that the amount David pays is either $100 or $142, depending on a coin toss,
Diva still has income from the passage of time. Id.
20 Id. at 255-57. See Jeff Strnad, Periodicity and Accretion Taxation: Norms and Implementation,

99 YALE L. J. 1817, 1879 (1990) (describing the timing option as the "ability to take losses
early and defer any later matching gains") citing George M. Constantinides, CapitalMarket
and Equilibrium with PersonalTax, 51 EcONOMETRICA 611 (1983).
Professor Schizer explains the timing option without reference to matching gains. He
analogizes the income tax to an arrangement between the taxpayer and the federal
government. If an asset increases in value, the government receives a portion of the
increase in taxes. If the asset decreases in value, the government reduces the taxpayer's
pre-tax loss through tax deductions. The timing option allows taxpayers to share gains and
losses on favorable terms by forcing the government to share losses on a contemporaneous
basis, but deferring the obligation to share gains indefinitely. See Schizer, supra note 14, at
1557.
21 See Shuldiner, supra note 18, at 257. Although a number of provisions, such as the capital
loss limitation rules of I.R.C. §1211 and the restrictions placed deductions for expenses and
losses associated with straddles by I.R.C. §263(g) and §1092, are intended to control the use
of the timing option and straddle techniques, these rules are of limited effectiveness.
22
When an investor holds a "long" position in an asset, she benefits if the asset increases in
value and suffers losses if the asset declines in value. Ownership of the hypothetical asset
in the discussion is a "long" position. When an investor holds a "short" position in an
asset, she benefits if the asset declines in value and suffers a loss if the asset increases in
value. Perfectly matched long and short positions in an asset offset each other
economically and result in no net economic income or loss to the investor over time.
2 See Shuldiner, supra note 18, at 261.
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by utilizing deferral and the timing option. In addition, realization may
undermine the progressivity of the tax system. The reduction in effective
tax rates achieved by realization redounds to the benefit of upper-income
taxpayers because ownership of capital assets is concentrated in the
upper reaches of the income distribution 4 (and perhaps for other
reasons as well).
Second, because realization reduces the effective tax rate on income
from some assets and not others, it may result in inefficient allocation of
resources among investments from an ex ante perspective. 25 In addition,
realization can deter taxpayers from changing their investments to
maximize yields because doing so can terminate the valuable deferral
26
and trigger the tax.
Third, even though the realization requirement can be defended on
the grounds of promoting administrative convenience by avoiding
valuation and liquidity issues, the principle as manifested through the
tax law creates its own set of thorny administrative problems.

24 See

id. at 262. Professor Shuldiner points out that if the tax benefit of deferral is fully
capitalized into the price of assets that provide deferral opportunities, then no issue of
fairness remains. He also points out that the expected value of unanticipated deferral
(utilized through the timing option) is zero, and so the expected tax rate on gains or loss is
the statutory rate. "On an ex post basis, however, the holder of an instrument with
unanticipated deferral is taxed at an effective rate less than the statutory rate." Id. at 263.
That a difference in rates ex post might be considered unfair, even if there is no difference
in rates ex ante, is hardly a point worth debating.
25 First, realization directs capital away from investments that produce streams of income
that are currently taxable and toward investments that produce income in the form of
appreciation. All things being equal, the after-tax yield on the latter will be higher as a
result of realization. Moreover, because the timing option becomes more valuable as the
variance of the return on a transaction increases, realization may encourage investment in
risky assets. Finally, the significant transaction costs investors incur in utilizing the
straddle technique may also be a source of inefficiency. But, because straddles are
balanced positions with no net investment or risk, they should not result in a misallocation
of resources. See id. at 258-61. See also Edward A. Zelinsky, ForRealization: Income Taxation,
Sectoral Accretionism, and the Virtue of Attainable Virtues, 19 CARDOzO L. REv. 861, 914 (1997).
26 This is called the "lock-in" effect. As a simplified example, consider an individual subject
to a 40% marginal income tax rate who has $200 of appreciation in asset A on which the
taxpayer expects to earn 10% per year, compounded annually. Imagine the taxpayer also
has the opportunity to realize that appreciation and reinvest it in asset B that will
appreciate at a 13% annual return. Assume that at the end of five years each investment
will terminate and the taxpayer will have a realization event. The taxpayer will not
reinvest the $200 in the higher-yielding asset (at least not in a way that will result in
realization for tax purposes), because the after-tax amount he will receive if he keeps his
money where it is ($193.26) is higher than the after-tax amount he would receive if he
reinvested his gains ($180.60). See Schizer, supra note 14, at 1610-11.
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Taxpayers, recognizing that the distinction between transactions that
trigger realization and those that do not is essentially arbitrary, rationally
seek to structure transactions to fall on the desired side of the line. Thus,
taxpayers who wish to dispose of appreciated assets seek to do so
without triggering realization, and strategies exist to achieve that goal.
Conversely, taxpayers who wish to realize losses without disposing of
depreciated assets also have techniques to which they can resort. The
government responds by proposing more and more specific and
complex rules to control realization events, preventing realization in
some cases and triggering it in others. In addition, the rules attempt to
reduce the benefits of realization by adopting rules aimed at limiting
taxpayers' ability to use liquid, easy-to-value financial positions to
accelerate losses and defer gains. 7 This is a vicious cycle of taxpayers
exploiting the weaknesses of realization and lawmakers responding with
ad hoc efforts aimed at abuse. It has led to a briar patch of rules that are
formalistic, difficult to understand, difficult for taxpayers to comply
with, and virtually impossible for the IRS to enforce.
As one might expect, this problem has not lacked for scholarly
attention. 28 Many have detailed the flaws in our realization-based
system and suggested ways to reduce or eliminate our reliance on
realization and jettison many of the complex rules that have grown up
around it. Although some have attempted to develop pure accretion
systems that would tax all economic appreciation or depreciation as it
occurs, 29 the trend seems to be toward a more pragmatic approach:
developing a better "mixed" system that includes some continued role
for realization. 30

27 See

Halperin, supra note 5, at 969-70. See Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Commentary: Financial

Contract Innovation and Income Tax Policy, 107 HARV. L. REV. 460 (1993), for a discussion of
various uses of financial products. See William M. Paul, Constructive Sale UnderNew Section

1259, TAX NoTEs, Sept. 15, 1997, at 1467, for a discussion of the Congressional response to a
specific income-deferring strategy.
28 For overviews of scholarly work in this area, see Zelinsky, supra note 25, at 866-79;
Schizer,
supra note 14, at 1593-1600.
29
See, e.g., David Shakow, Taxation without Realization: A Proposalfor Accrual Taxation, 134 U.
PA. L. REv. 1111 (1986); Fred B. Brown, "Complete" Accrual Taxation, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
1559 (1996).
30 See, e.g., Weisbach, supra note 6, at 96 (reviewing proposals for mixed systems); Warren,
supra note 27, at 473-82 (surveying different suggested approaches); Shuldiner, supra note
18, at 283-90; Deborah H. Schenk, Taxation of Equity Derivatives,a PartialIntegrationProposal,
50 TAX L.REV.571 (1995); Jeff Stmad, The Taxation of Bonds: the Tax Trading Dimension, 81
VA. L. REV.47, 115 (1995).
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The mixed system that has been proposed by Professor Halperin
would require all taxpayers to use mark-to-market accounting for a
broad class of assets (and liabilities). 31 Taxpayers would account for any
increase or decrease in market value of these positions each year and pay
tax (or receive a credit or refund) on the net change. The problem with
this regime, however, is specifying whether any particular position
should be included. By necessity, adopting a partial mark-to-market
system would require line-drawing. Positions subject to mark-to-market
would have to be distinguished from those that remain under
realization. 32
Going back to the justification for the realization rule, one would
want to avoid applying a mark-to-market approach to positions that are
hard to value or are illiquid (which probably turn out to be overlapping
groups). Similarly, one would get the most benefit from the mixed
system if the mark-to-market method applied to those positions most
easily used to manipulate realized gains or losses. Professor Weisbach
suggests an abstract test for whether a position should be included in the
mark-to-market regime: compare the costs of applying mark-to-market
to the position (for instance, problems with valuation and liquidity) to
the benefits of withdrawing the position from the scope of the realization

31 Other

mixed systems are conceivable. Current tax law provides a limited version of
mixed systems. It requires some taxpayers to use mark-to-market accounting for certain of
their assets and liabilities. See I.R.C. §475 (requiring dealers in securities to mark-to-market
their positions in securities and hedges in those securities). It also requires or allows all
taxpayers to mark-to-market narrowly defined categories of financial instruments. See
I.R.C. §1256 (requiring mark-to-market accounting for regulated futures contracts, foreign
currency contracts, non-equity options and dealer equity options); I.R.C. §1296 (allowing
certain owners of "marketable" stock in a passive foreign investment company to use
mark-to-market accounting).
32 Professor Zelinsky argues that drawing a line between assets that are subject to a markto-market regime and those that are not would create the same kind of allocative
inefficiency that realization does. This is because mark-to-market would raise the effective
tax rate of income from assets included in the base relative to assets still taxed under
realization. See Zelinsky, supra note 25, at 915-18. Professor Weisbach suggests that to
reduce the inefficiencies of taxing some assets and liabilities under one regime and the rest
under another, the nominal tax rate for items included in the mark-to-market base should
approximate the effective tax rate on items still subject to realization. In other words, the
rate of tax that would apply to mark-to-market income and loss would be lower than the
rate that would apply to realized gains and losses. See Weisbach, supra note 6, at 100-1. It
is unclear how this could be accomplished.
For purposes of my discussion, I assume there are significant limits to our ability to
achieve rate equality. Thus, there would continue to be a compelling need to draw
discernable and enforceable lines between the realization regime and the mark-to-market
regime.
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principle (such as a more accurate measurement of a taxpayer' s income
and reduced rule complexity).3 But translating this standard into rules
that the IRS and taxpayers can apply is a difficult problem.
One way to solve this problem is to classify assets and liabilities
according to characteristics that tend to make them easy to value and
liquid. There seems to be a consensus that public trading is a
characteristic of a stock or security that would militate in favor of
including an asset in a partial mark-to-market regime. These assets are,
it is said, easy to value and highly liquid. In addition, the fairness,
efficiency and complexity costs of taxing them under realization are
high.34 Professor Weisbach goes as far as to suggest application of the
realization requirement to these positions is merely a historical
accident.3
Limiting the base of the mark-to-market regime to publicly traded
stock and securities, however, would probably not provide significant
relief from the problems engendered by realization, as Professor
Weisbach points out. To avoid mark-to-market (and retain the benefits
of realization), taxpayers could simply shift from direct positions in stock
and securities to derivative positions; fairness, efficiency, and complexity
problems would persist. 36 For example, instead of investing in stock
directly, an individual might enter into an equity swap under which she
would be entitled to payments equal to all the stock's appreciation and
would be required to make payments to the extent of the stock's decline
in value. If the equity swap was structured properly, the investor could
retain a significant portion of the gain deferral, timing option, and
straddle benefits that she had for a direct investment. Thus, even if there
is no public market for a certain derivative, such as an over-the-counter
option, forward, swap, or notional principal contract, or a contingent
payment debt instrument, the derivative should be included in the markto-market base if it is a reasonable substitute for publicly traded
property. To minimize inefficiencies in adopting a partial mark-tomarket regime, Professor Weisbach concludes, derivative instruments
should be taxed as their closest substitutes are.37

33See Weisbach, supra note 6, at 103.
mSee id.
3
5See id. at96.
3 Cf. id. at 103-6.
3See id. at 105.
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Moreover, a partial mark-to-market system probably should not be
38
limited to publicly traded stock, securities, and their derivatives.
Professor Weisbach believes that implementation of a partial mark-tomarket system would require comparing the benefits of mark-to-market
accounting to its costs for numerous different transactions. 39 This
analysis is likely to be difficult, time consuming, and fraught with
uncertainty.
But even limited to positions in publicly traded property (including
derivatives), it is thought that a mark-to-market regime could reduce
inefficiency attributable to deferral, the timing option, and the straddle
technique. 40 Moreover, it would allow significant pruning of a number
of complex provisions from the tax law. 41
So perhaps we should examine the "easy" case of marking publicly
traded stocks, securities, and their derivatives before we take on the
harder chore of deciding whether other assets should be included in the
base.
II.

THE SCOPE OF THE MARK-TO-MARKET BASE

When I put on my tax administrator's hat, it seems to me the first
question is what do we mean by the term "publicly traded stocks and
securities"? To define publicly traded stocks and securities as financial
instruments that are easy to value and highly liquid is tautological. If the
income tax adopted a partial mark-to-market regime, we would need a
clearer picture of the test for public trading and the mechanism for
determining whether a particular stock or security met that test. In other
38 In his article, Professor Weisbach also says that most debt, whether asset or liability,

traded or not, generally should be included in the mark-to-market base. See id. at 108-14.

This recommendation is partially based on the inaccuracy of current rules requiring accrual
of original issue discount. See Joseph Bankman & William A. Klein, Accurate Taxation of
Long-Term Debt: Taking Into Account the Term Structureof Interest,44 TAx L. REV. 335 (1989);
Theodore S. Sims, Long-Term Debt, the Term Structure of Interest and the Case for Accrual
Taxation, 47 TAX L. REV. 313 (1992). It is also based on the tax savings that can be obtained
by holders of debt instruments who engage in strategic trading to accelerate losses and
defer gains. See generally Strnad, supra note 30 [The Taxation of Bonds: the Tax Trading
Dimension]; Mark Gergen, The Effects of Price Volatility and Strategic Trading under
Realization, Expected Return, and Retrospective Taxation, 49 TAX. L. REV. 209 (1994). But
Professor Weisbach's recommendation raises the specter of trying to distinguish between
debt and other liabilities, such as leases, and trying to disaggregate debt from non-financial
transactions, such as deferred payments or prepayments for goods or services.
3 See Weisbach, supra note 6, at 105.
40 See id. at 131-3; Halperin, supra note 5, at 972.
41 See Weisbach, supra note 6, at 122-31.
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words, is it possible to translate the concept of "public trading" into a
satisfactory statutory or regulatory definition?
We probably mean two things when we say a financial instrument is
"publicly traded." First, we mean that the instrument is sold by willing
sellers to willing, unrelated buyers with enough regularity to provide a
reliable approximation of the price at which any holder could
contemporaneously sell the instrument. Second, we mean that there is a
mechanism for broadly disseminating information about that price.
Articulated this way, however, public trading continues to be a
mere abstraction. To define the term in the abstract is a long way from
providing a concrete set of rules that would allow taxpayers and the
government to discern the real-world scope of a mark-to-market regime.
There are no objective measures for whether a financial instrument
meets my two tests. Rather, determining that an instrument should be
treated as publicly traded would be prudential.
How should that definitional exercise be carried out? What is the
proper emphasis between the two elements of public trading, and how
specific or general should a definition of public trading be? Should the
definition of public trading provide bright-line rules, or require the
taxpayer or the government to exercise judgment?
Some examples of this exercise can be found in current tax law. The
public trading concept is used in many provisions under the tax code,
and it is described in a number of different ways. It is not my purpose to
discuss them all, or even a significant portion of them, but a small
sample will illuminate what is at stake. Current law shows that there is
not a single, universally accepted definition of public trading for tax
purposes. Examining the way some provisions of current law make the
abstract idea of public trading more concrete shows some of the choices
that would have to be made in adopting a partial mark-to-market
method for publicly traded stocks and securities.
The straddle rules under IRC §1092 defer deductions for losses
when a taxpayer holds offsetting positions in "actively traded" personal
property. Regulations treat property as actively traded under this
provision if there is an established financial market for the property.42
The regulations provide a list of established financial markets, which
includes national securities exchanges like the New York Stock Exchange

42 See

Treas. Reg. §1.1092(d)-l (a) (1993).
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and the American Stock Exchange, the National Association of Securities
Dealers' interdealer quotation system, commodities exchanges like the
43
Chicago Board of Trade and over-the-counter, "interdealer" markets.
The regulations are relatively formalistic, relying on objective indicators
of price availability without requiring a separate determination of
whether there is enough trading in the security to produce accurate
prices. 44
The rules that prevent taxpayers from deferring tax on earnings
from "passive foreign investment companies" allow taxpayers who hold
interests in these companies to elect to mark their interest to market if the
interests are "marketable." 45 These rules have a much narrower
conception of what it means for a stock to be publicly traded than do the
straddle rules. A stock is "marketable" only if it is "regularly" traded on
a national exchange or market system in the United States, or on a
market that is determined by the Treasury Department to provide prices
that represent fair market value. 46 Here, it appears, the overriding
concern is whether the price provided by the market is reliable so that
taxpayers cannot understate the value of their stock to take advantage of
the deferral that the passive foreign investment company rules were
enacted to prevent in the first place.
Public trading is also relevant to the tax treatment of partnerships.
A publicly traded partnership is generally taxed as a corporation rather
than as a flow-through entity.47 The regulations define public trading
broadly. The definition covers partnership interests traded on national
securities exchanges, including exchanges that have a low number of
transactions, many foreign securities exchanges, and interdealer

43Treas. Reg. §1.1092(d)-1(b)(1) (1993).
" This may somewhat over-simplify the regulations. Established financial markets also
include "interdealer markets" and "debt markets," both of which are defined to insure an
element of price reliability. Treas. Regs. §§1.1092(d)-1(b)(1)(vi) and (vii) (1993). An
"interdealer market" is a system that provides a "reasonable basis" for determining fair
market value, such as "recent" price quotations or prices of "recent" transactions. Treas.
Reg. §1.1092(d)-l(b)(2)(i) (1993). A debt market exists, subject to certain limitations, if
"price quotations...are readily available from brokers, dealers or traders." Treas. Reg.
§1.1092(d)-1(b)(2)(ii) (1993).
45 I.R.C. §1296. Taxpayers may use this election to avoid rules that treat a portion of sale
proceeds and certain distributions as earnings attributable to prior taxable years. These
amounts would otherwise be taxed at the highest marginal rates applicable in the prior
years, and would be subject to an interest charge for deferral. See I.RC. § 1291.
4 See I.R.C. §1296(e)(1)(A).
See also JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION ENACTED IN 1997 311 (Comm. Print 1997).
47See I.R.C. §7704(a).
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quotation systems that provide firm buy or sell quotations. 48 It also
includes interests "readily tradable" on secondary markets or their
equivalent. 49 But the regulations place a significant limit on the scope of
the public trading definition: a partnership's interests are publicly traded
only if the partnership itself facilitates the trading. 5°
Each approach to defining a public trading concept gives different
weight to the characteristics embodied in the term. The provision
defining marketable stock of passive foreign investment companies is
oriented toward insuring that an instrument is not marked-to-market
unless the taxpayer (and the IRS) can determine market prices with a
high level of confidence. In other words, if accuracy of value is
important, a public trading definition like that provided by the straddle
regulations may be too broad. In contrast, the regulations that define
public trading in the partnership context are oriented toward treating
any price disseminating process, such as computer bulletin boards or
listings on the Internet, as indicative of public trading. By that token, the
public trading definition used under the straddle rules may be too
narrow.
The regulations illustrate another important consideration-whether
the definition of public trading must provide bright lines, or whether it
can simply enumerate general characteristics and allow taxpayers and
the IRS to use discretion on a case-by-case basis. The "active trading"
definition under the straddle rules calls for the exercise of some
discretion by the IRS and taxpayers. The rules for passive foreign
investment companies take a much narrower and more formalistic
approach by limiting the scope of public trading under the statute to,
essentially, trading that occurs on a national securities exchange or
market system. The regulations under section 7704 take a different tack.

4 See Treas. Reg. §1.7704-1(b) (1995).
49 See Treas. Reg. §1.7704-1(c) (1995). A secondary market exists if holders of the
partnership's interests have a "readily available, regular and ongoing opportunity to sell or
exchange" interests through a means that publicly disseminates information about offers.
Treas. Reg. §1.7704-1(c)(2)(iii) (1995).
w"See Treas. Reg. §1.7704-1(d) (1995). The partnership is not publicly traded, even if its

interests are traded on a secondary market or its equivalent, unless "[t]he partnership
participates in the establishment of the market or the inclusion of its interests" in the
market, or the partnership "recognizes any transfers made on the market" by redeeming
the interests of the transferor partners or admitting the transferee to the partnership or
recognizing the transferee as a partner. Id. Moreover, a partnership is not treated as
readily tradable on a secondary market or its equivalent if there is only a small amount of
trading in its interests. See Treas. Reg. §1.7704-10) (1995).
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While they eschew a formalistic definition of public trading, they require
a partnership to take action before it can be considered publicly traded.
This places a significant limit on the application of the provision to the
interests of any particular partnership and gives power over
classification, at least in part, to those who manage or control the
partnership (rather than to all interest holders). These rules suggest, at
least in this context, that a broad, imprecise definition of public trading
may produce an unacceptable level of uncertainty.
As the prior discussion illustrates, there is no clear consensus
under current tax law of how public trading should be defined when it
comes to stocks and securities. So, while saying that a mark-to-market
regime should apply to publicly traded financial instruments may help
conceptually to circumscribe the mark-to-market base, it does not solve
the problem of how to write rules that would achieve this result.
Moreover, devising a rule for derivatives would prove even more
difficult. As the earlier portion of this paper discussed, a mark-to-market
system that applied to publicly traded stocks and securities should also
apply to their close substitutes. This statement is, at least in part, based
on the proposition that if a derivative is a close substitute for a publicly
traded financial instrument it should be sufficiently liquid and easy to
value to merit inclusion in the mark-to-market regime.51 But on its face,
articulating rules to test whether a non-publicly traded financial
instrument is a close substitute for a publicly traded instrument seems
more difficult than defining what constitutes public trading.
The test for whether a derivative meets an abstract "close
substitute" or ease of valuation and liquidity metric could not rest on a
mere observation that the derivative is somehow based on the value of,
or the payments on, a publicly traded financial instrument. Consider the
dividend swap: a party agrees to pay all the dividends on a specified
number of shares of a publicly traded stock for a specified period. In
exchange, he will receive periodic payments equal to a particular interest
rate index times a notional principal amount (set equal to the initial
value of the shares of stock).52 On one hand, the swap likely does not by
itself represent a close substitute for any publicly traded financial
instrument-it represents only a small temporal piece of ownership of the
underlying stock. It may be difficult for the taxpayer to derive a value
51See Weisbach, supra note 6, at 105.
5 See Report of the Tax Section of the New York State Bar Association on Notional Principal
Contract Characterand Timing Issues, reprinted in TAX NOTES, June 8, 1998, at 1303, 1309
(describing and dividend swap and other esoteric notional principal contracts).
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for the swap from the value of that stock. On the other hand, a dividend
swap combined with another contract, such as the right or obligation to
purchase the underlying stock for a fixed price in the future, could
represent a very close substitute for ownership of the stock itself. This
suggests that one might want to provide rules that require taxpayers to
mark-to-market derivative positions that combined constitute close
substitutes for publicly traded stocks and securities; but this would
invite significant additional complexity.
At any rate, it is difficult to imagine a relatively simple test that
could rely on objective characteristics (comparable to exchange-listing
for stocks) as markers for liquidity and easy valuation in the case of
many derivative financial instruments. If these contracts were to be
included in the mark-to-market base one can imagine that they would be
included either by general standards of uncertain application or by
clearer, more easily applied rules that would lead to arbitrary results and
potential abuse.
But what does it matter whether a particular financial instrument is
included or excluded from the mark-to-market base in a mixed system,
provided that a reasonably broad group of positions is included? To put
it another way, why should uncertainty about whether a particular
position qualifies as "publicly traded" be of particular concern under a
partial mark-to-market regime? Uncertainty about what is included in
the base would allow taxpayers (or the government) to decide whether
an asset should be subject to mark-to-market after unanticipated changes
in value are known. For example, when the value of an instrument
declined while in the taxpayer's hands, the taxpayer would want the
instrument to be included in the mark-to-market base if he had the
option. If the asset appreciated, the converse would be true. If taxpayers
were permitted to "correct" a mistaken inclusion of an instrument in (or
exclusion of an instrument from) the mark-to-market base, then
uncertainty about whether an instrument should be treated as publicly
traded would provide that option.
The taxpayer's ability to make ex post determinations based on
knowledge of unanticipated price changes could be restricted. For
example, taxpayers could be required to indicate at the time of
acquisition whether an instrument should be included in or excluded
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53
from the mark-to-market base and could be held to that determination.
Controlling taxpayer selectivity alone, however, would not necessarily
eliminate the costs of uncertainty. For example, in a partial mark-tomarket system taxpayers would be likely to take the tax treatment of
instruments into account in making investment decisions. If instruments
were treated differently than anticipated, claims of unfairness and
additional inefficiency might result. A rule that required taxpayers to
designate an instrument as publicly traded would not prevent the
government from using information about changes in value to
selectively challenge taxpayers' designations.54 Thus, even limited
uncertainty about the borders of the public trading definition might
undercut the efficiency improvements of a partial mark-to-market
regime by giving taxpayers an incentive or disincentive to invest in
financial instruments that are at the margin.

Regardless, adopting a partial mark-to-market regime would
require a new set of complex definitional rules. By complex, I mean
rules that are hard to understand or comply with, or rules that are so
detailed that most individuals would not be able to master them. One
only needs to examine the current definitions of "actively traded,"
"marketable," or "publicly traded" under current regulations to see how
complex such rules can become.55 Does this necessity offset the benefits
of adopting partial mark-to-market? This is a question that is difficult to
answer. But we must keep in mind the competing costs inherent in
delineating the base of the mark-to-market regime, even for the easiest
case.
HI.

VALUING POSITIONS INCLUDED IN THE MARK-TO-MARKET REGIME

Many assets are hard to value in the absence of a sale-that is the
heart of the problem with a mark-to-market regime. In theory, however,

53This

is the strategy adopted by the mark-to-market rules that apply to securities dealers.

See I.R.C. §§475(b)(2), (c)(2)(F)(iii), and (d)(2).
54We could, for purposes of argument, assume that government agents would never use
hindsight in determining whether an asset should be included in the mark-to-market base.
But the temptation would be hard to resist. Moreover, even if they did not make
retrospective determinations about whether an instrument should be subject to mark-tomarket based on the performance of the investment, it would probably appear to taxpayers
that they did. After all, it is generally not an IRS agent's job to point out to the taxpayer
that he paid too much tax.
5 See Treas. Reg. §1.1092(d)-1(a) (1993); Treas. Reg. §1.7704-1(c) (1995); Temp. Treas. Reg.
§15A.453-1(e)(4) (as amended in 1994) (describing a readily tradable debt instrument for
purposes of determining whether payment has been made under an installment sale).
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publicly traded stocks and securities should not be difficult to value, and
so this argument does not mandate a realization requirement for them.
As we have seen, however, a partial mark-to-market regime that would
apply to publicly traded stocks and securities but would not apply to
their derivatives might make little improvement in the fairness,
efficiency, or simplicity of the overall tax system. While some may find
reason to think that these derivatives would not present overwhelming
valuation problems, I believe that even a narrowly targeted mark-tomarket regime is likely to spark significant disputes over valuation if
they are included in the base.
The fair market values of many derivatives cannot be observed from
market prices because they are not listed on exchanges or traded on
markets, and no buy or sell prices on outstanding contracts are quoted
by market makers. Rather, the values have to be estimated through the
use of financial models. This makes the values they are assigned
suspect. The point of adopting a mark-to-market regime is to provide a
better measure of income, and inaccurate valuations would undermine
that goal by imposing tax arbitrarily. The more inaccurate valuations
are, the more a mark-to-market system for financial instruments will
tend to approach realization.
This tendency can be viewed from two different perspectives. First,
taxpayers may have difficulties proving that they have properly valued
their derivatives. Thus, despite a taxpayer's honest efforts to correctly
value her financial positions, the IRS could reject the values and use
hindsight to impose new values. The IRS could accelerate the taxpayer's
gains by challenging her on the valuation of her winners and letting her
losers run.
For example, assume a taxpayer has two assets, derivative A and
derivative B, each of which has a starting value of $50. She values each
at $100 at the end of the year. In the second year the taxpayer unwinds
derivative A and receives a net payment of $190. She values derivative B
at $10 at the end of the year. The government might attempt to use the
unwind payment as evidence that the value assigned to derivative A in
the first year was too low. If successful, the government would
accelerate gains on derivative A into the first year. It is conceivable that
the taxpayer could respond by asserting that she also mis-valued
derivative B in the first year. In practice, however, a taxpayer may not be
able to disavow earlier valuations, especially if the taxpayer has a great
many financial positions and the government challenges the valuation of
only a portion.
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The more likely scenario, however, is that the government will have
difficulty policing the values taxpayers place on their derivatives.
Taxpayers have much more information about the value of their
If taxpayers could
financial positions than the government.
systematically undervalue assets or overstate liabilities, they could defer
income under a mark-to-market regime. Even a randomly inaccurate
valuation model would allow taxpayers to realize losses on overvalued
securities and derivatives (by selling or unwinding) and to defer income
from the undervalued ones.56
Valuation problems could significantly erode the promised fairness
and efficiency of a partial mark-to-market regime. Although a mark-tomarket regime with imprecise valuation might still reduce the unfairness
and inefficiency of the tax system, it would do so at significant
administrative cost. Thus, the taxpayer's abilities to sustain their
valuations and the government's ability to police the values that
taxpayers assign are important considerations in assessing the
advisability of adopting a partial mark-to-market system.
How difficult would it be to value financial derivatives? That is an
empirical question that is difficult to answer. Some suggest that two
factors-the availability of computer programs that can run derivative
valuation models and the regulatory and financial accounting standards
requiring taxpayers to value their securities and derivatives at fair
market values--should decrease concerns about the accuracy of valuation
under a mark-to-market regime.
But evidence to the contrary can be found in the IRS's experience
with valuing securities under the mark-to-market regime that applies to
securities dealers.58 Despite the fact that securities dealers have been
required to use mark-to-market accounting for tax purposes for more
than five years, no good mechanism has evolved to allow taxpayers to

5%This

assumes, of course, that a more accurate price would be produced by arm's-length
negotiations with third parties over unwind or sales price, and that the taxpayer would be
aware that the value indicated by the taxpayer's pricing model is different than the
negotiated unwind or sales price.
57 See Weisbach, supra note 6, at 107-8. Cf. David S. Miller, Taxpayers' Ability to Avoid Tax
Ownership: Current Law and Future Prospects,51 TAX LAW 279, 343 (1998).
%I.R.C. §475 requires dealers in securities to mark all of their positions in securities to
market, including securities that are not publicly traded.
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feel confident about their tax returns or to insure they are not using
valuation strategies to reduce taxes.5 9
In 1995, the IRS initiated a plan to create a system that would allow
it to audit the values securities dealers place on their derivative
positions. Recognizing the complexities of valuing derivatives, the IRS
hired Los Alamos Laboratories to develop a system that could provide
IRS auditors with values for interest rate swaps. 60 The IRS and Los
Alamos Laboratories worked together on this project for several years,
but even though Los Alamos had significant resources to devote to the
project, 61 and interest rate swaps are one of the least complex and best
62
understood derivatives, the project ultimately failed.
It is not possible to be certain why the IRS abandoned the Los
Alamos project. It may have been a budgetary issue, which is worrisome
in itself. But another possible reason is the hostility that the community
of securities dealers had toward the project. The securities industry
claimed the Los Alamos model would not produce reasonable values for
interest rate derivatives. The model, they argued, could not adequately
take into account liquidity, credit, volatility, and certain other kind of
risks that securities dealers are exposed to in interest rate swaps. 63
Ultimately, however, it appears that objections were based on concerns
about how the tax system would harmonize competing valuation models

Indeed, there are strong hints that taxpayers are using valuation strategies to reduce
taxes under I.R.C. §475. It is common wisdom that dealers mark receivables and other debt
instruments down from face value to reflect changes in interest rates and obligor credit
quality, but never mark the instruments above face value. Cf. Oggie Caginalp et al., The
Mark-to-market Rules of Section 475-an Update, TAx NOTES, Nov. 24, 1997, at 961, 966
(expressing doubt about whether a demand obligation that bears an above-market interest
rate (such as a credit card receivable) would ever be valued above its stated principal
amount under a mark-to-market regime, even if its true fair market value might be higher).
While some might argue that this strategy should not make a meaningful difference in tax
collections, its similarity to the bond trading strategies described by Professor Stmad
(which can significantly reduce the taxes) would cast doubt on this assertion. See Stmad,
supranote 30, at 75-79 [The Taxation of Bonds: the Tax Trading Dimension].
60 See John Turro, IRS Contracting to Produce Derivatives-Valuation Software, TAX NOTES
TODAY 48-46, Mar. 10, 1995, availablein LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT file.
61 For a recent discussion of the capabilities of former Los Alamos Laboratory scientists, see
Thomas Petzinger Jr., Sometimes it Takes a Nuclear Scientist to Decode a Market, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 12, 1999, at BI.
62 See Darren Allen, IRS Seeks Viable Valuation Methods; Official Predicts Uncertainty for
Dealers, 120 DAILY TAx REP., June 23,1998, at G1-2.
63
See id.
59
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and whether a program that would spot-check taxpayers' valuations
could be fair."
The securities industry has consistently argued that the IRS should
65
rely on the valuations securities dealers use for non-tax book purposes.
The tension between a desire for high book income and the desire for
low taxable income would, the industry says, protect the integrity of
their valuations of derivatives. The industry would not understate book
value to reduce taxes, so the argument goes, because the non-tax costs of
doing so would outweigh the benefits. For example, because book
values are used for financial statement purposes and for purposes of
determining the capital that a dealer is required to keep in highly liquid
assets (and therefore cannot use for risky enterprises), securities dealers
experience significant pressure to place high values on their portfolios.
In addition, they argue, each trader is compensated based on the value of
the portfolio he or she trades. 66 Therefore, significant pressure exists
within the firm to value securities correctly relative to other securities.
The IRS has yet to adopt this approach explicitly. 67 It has never
officially articulated its reasons, but one can imagine it is motivated by a

64The program was intended to "batch process" dealer positions (for instance, process

large numbers of positions automatically). But it probably was never meant to make
overall adjustments to a taxpayer's return. Instead, it was originally intended to allow
auditors to question the valuation of specific positions. Although the IRS possibly could
have used the system to evaluate the process by which the taxpayer was valuing its
derivative positions, instead of the values of the positions themselves, it is unclear whether
the IRS intended to use the Los Alamos model this way or whether the IRS had the
expertise to do so. For an argument in favor of the more general approach, see Phillip
Mann, American Bar Association Tax Section Members Comment on Valuation Software, TAX
NOTES TODAY 186-42, Sept. 25,1997, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT file (suggesting
that Los Alamos model be used to develop evidence of reasonableness of taxpayer's
method of valuing derivatives, rather than actually to value positions held by taxpayers).
6 Id.; Letter from Hal I. Gann, Miller & Chevalier, to the Internal Revenue Service (July 25,
1997) reprinted in TAX NOTES TODAY 162-27, Aug. 21, 1997, available in LEXIS, Fedtax
Library, TNT file; Letter from Debra M. Aaron, Wall Street Tax Association, to Belinda S.
McCafferty, Internal Revenue Service (Apr. 17, 1997) reprinted in TAX NOTES TODAY 89-33,
May 8,1997, availablein LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT file; Letter from Debra M. Aaron, Wall
Street Tax Association, to Suzanne Boule, Internal Revenue Service (Mar. 11,1997) reprinted
in TAX NOTES TODAY 59-52, Mar. 27, 1997, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT file;
Letter from Henry Ruempler, American Bankers Association, to the Internal Revenue
Service (Feb. 28, 1994) reprintedin TAX NOTES TODAY 46-58, Mar. 9, 1994, availablein LEXIS,
Fedtax Library, TNT file.
"Cf. Letter from Debra M. Aaron, Wall Street Tax Association, to Suzanne Boule, Internal
Revenue Service, supranote 65.
67 Indeed, at the time the legislation enacting I.R.C. §475 was under consideration, the
securities industry recommended that the legislation provide a presumption in favor of
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worry that taxpayers' impulse to reduce taxes may overpower
countervailing pressures. If book value was adopted as presumptively
correct for tax purposes, securities dealers might find ways to reduce the
tension between tax considerations and financial and regulatory
accounting rules and employee compensation practices. It is not hard to
conceive of the industry recruiting its regulators in the effort. There are
examples of regulators who accommodate the strategies of their
regulated industries to this end, even when to do so would seem counter
to the interests that the regulators are charged to protect. 68
Still, public companies seem to face enormous pressure to keep their
financial statement income high.69 Businesses are subject to increasing
requirements to report the value of their financial instruments under
Generally Accepted Accounting Procedures (GAAP), which could lessen
concerns about systematic understatement of value. 70 However, in the

book value. See Letter from Hal I.Gann, Miller & Chevalier, to the Internal Revenue
Service, supra note 65. This approach was not adopted by the legislation or by the
legislative history, even though it may have been assumed at the time that the IRS would
implement § 475 with a de facto presumption in favor of a dealer's book value. See id.; See
also COMMIrrEE ON THE BuDGET, CONFERENCE REPORT ON THE OMNIBus BUDGET
RECONCILIATION ACT OF 1993, H.R. Doc. No. 103-213, at 616 (1993).
68See Cottage Savings Assoc. v. Comm'r, 499 U.S. 554 (1991). This case describes a situation
in which the Federal Home Loan Bank Board appeared to manipulate its own accounting
rules to allow savings and loans to claim tax losses without incurring losses for regulatory
accounting purposes, even though doing so also may have been in conflict with the Board's
own mission of policing the solvency of the savings and loans. The Federal Reserve Board
provides another example. In 1994, banks tried to convince the IRS to allow interest
deductions for instruments that would obtain a desirable equity classification under
existing Federal Reserve regulatory capital rules. When they failed, they convinced the
Federal Reserve Board to change its rules so that they could treat "monthly income
preferred securities," which can be debt for tax purposes, as equity capital for non-tax
regulatory purposes. Cf.John C. Reid, MIPS Besieged-Solutions in Search of a Problem, TAX
NOTES, Dec. 1, 1997, at 1057, 1063 ("Query whether this can be interpreted as the Federal
Reserve cooperating with the issuers to achieve [equity] status and a tax deduction for
interest paid.")
One might argue that these examples are inapposite, because in each case the
regulator changed its rules to allow an arbitragebetween the regulatory accounting rules
and the tax rules. If tax rules followed accounting rules, taxpayers would not have
benefitted from the changes. Nonetheless, the examples suggest that regulators are willing
to take their "constituents'" tax needs into account when formulating their own rules.
69 If there were not such great pressure, many of the currently popular corporate tax
shelters, which allow taxpayers to keep financial accounting income high while reducing
taxable income, would hold less attraction. See Bankman, supra note 4, at 1780-81.
70 FASB 107 requires businesses that file financial statements under Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles ("GAAP") to disclose in footnotes the fair value of the financial
instruments they own. In the future these businesses may be required to include the value
of the instruments directly on their balance sheets. See DISCLOSURES ABOUT FAIR MARKET
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absence of complete continuity between the mark-to-market base for
accounting purposes and the base for income tax purposes, taxpayers
might retain the ability to manipulate values (and taxable income)
without substantially affecting their overall financial statement position.
Complete continuity between the two bases would require tax rules to
conform strictly to accounting rules, which is an unlikely scenario.
Moreover, not all taxpayers produce GAAP financial statements, and so
the confidence this consideration brings to valuation of derivatives may
be limited.
IV.

POLITICAL RESISTANCE TO A MARK-TO-MARKET REGIME

I have only touched on the administrative problems that would
arise under the most basic partial mark-to-market proposal. But even if
this partial mark-to-market regime improved the efficiency and fairness
of the income tax and reduced complexity, there would be one more
obstacle to overcome-the antipathy of individuals (and their
representatives) to any rule that taxes income before it is realized. That
hostility is likely to be expressed as an argument that mark-to-market
would be too complex for the average individual.
I can image the protests against my assertion that individuals would
find a partial mark-to-market regime complex.
The realization
requirement necessitates complex rules, many of which, it is asserted,
could be eliminated if realization were replaced by mark-to-market for
traded stocks and securities (and their derivatives). Why would an
ordinary, middle-income taxpayer object to such a proposal? The

VALUE OF FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS

NO. 133 (Financial Accounting Standards Bd. 1998); Weisbach, supra note 6, at 107. In
addition, FASB 133 will require firms to account for their derivative positions at fair value
and to reflect changes in value in earnings. See ACCOUNTING FOR DERIVATIVE INSTRUMENTS
AND HEDGING ACTIVITIES, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 133

(Financial Accounting Standards Bd. 1998).
Businesses probably would be reluctant to report lower earnings under GAAP rules
just to save tax, because they use GAAP financial statements to communicate their value to
investors. It is conceivable, however, that businesses would "educate" analysts about the
reasons for low book valuations of their stocks, securities and derivative positions. There is
also some anecdotal evidence that securities analysts might not rely as heavily on some
parts of the GAAP financial statements as is commonly thought. In the context of a recent
debate about write-offs for research and development expenses in mergers, securities
analysts reportedly are giving more weight to cash flow and less weight to non-cash items.
See, e.g., Elizabeth MacDonald, Merging Firms are Renouncing R&D Write-Off, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 22, 1999, at C1,C3. Such a trend might make a FASB requirement to value financial
instruments at fair market value less significant.
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average individual does not hold arcane derivatives 1-she is much more
likely to own exchange-traded stock, securities, or mutual funds. She is
not likely to face significant difficulties determining which properties are
subject to mark-to-market or valuing those properties-most of this
information could be supplied by her investment advisor or securities
broker. Moreover, she is likely to benefit from a lower tax burden if the
system moves away from realization and toward a more accurate
measurement of income.72
By the same token, however, the ordinary individual taxpayer
probably does not often encounter the complex realization-based rules
that exist under current law. 3 Thus, a majority of individual taxpayers
are unlikely to find their tax calculation simplified by a partial mark-tomarket regime. The existence of two different regimes for taxing assets
(not to mention the possibility of marking debt to market) under a partial
mark-to-market approach might even be perceived as more complex.
But I am not arguing that the average taxpayer would find the
calculation of their tax significantly more difficult under a partial markto-market regime. Rather, I believe that the charge would be raised
because accepting a mark-to-market regime would require individuals to
change their understanding of how much income they have. I agree
with Professor Zelinsky's assessment that there is a "deep-rooted (if
economically naive) intuition.. .that unrealized appreciation constitutes
'paper gain' and is thus insufficiently authentic to be taxed." 74

n See Weisbach, supra note 6, at 107 (describing various rules that limit individuals' access
to non-traded financial instruments).
7
Overall efficiency improvements in the system are likely to make this taxpayer better off.
Moreover, it does not seem unreasonable to assume that high-income and wealthy
individuals benefit disproportionately from deferral, the timing option and straddle
techniques provided by the realization requirement and that therefore lower- and middleincome individuals would benefit disproportionately from the shift to a partial mark-tomarket regime. Cf.Shuldiner, supra note 18, at 261-5.
73 One obvious exception is the limitation of deduction for capital losses located in I.R.C.
§1211. Another point of interaction between individuals and the more complex realization
rules is the restriction on losses from wash sales. I.R.C. §1091 disallows a taxpayer's loss on
the sale of stock or securities if he replaces the stock or securities during a 30-day window
on either side of the sale. Evidence that a relatively broad cross-section of taxpayers plan
around these rules can be found in a regular end-of-the-year report in The Wall Street
Journal that describes cut-off dates for making wash sales without running afoul of the
disallowance. See, e.g., Vanessa O'Connell, Tax Report, WALL ST. J., Oct. 29,1997, at Al.
74See Zelinski, supra note 25, at 893.
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This intuition is hard for tax professionals to understand and accept.
We have internalized the Haig-Simons definition of income, so we tend
to think others are being disingenuous when they say that they think it is
unfair or complex to tax "phantom income" (to use the popular
pejorative). But my own experience leads me to believe that individuals'
attachment to the concept of realization is strong, sincere, and not
motivated simply by greed.
I am convinced that individuals' understanding of how much
income they have and their understanding of how much tax they pay
would make it difficult, if not impossible, to adopt a mark-to-market
5
regime that applied directly to financial instruments that they hold.7
My experience tells me that arguments about the efficiency benefits of a
mark-to-market system are unlikely to be persuasive because they would
be largely meaningless to most individuals. Moreover, many individuals
may believe they would have to pay more tax, observing that they have
to calculate the change in value of their stocks and securities every year
and pay tax on the income and realizing that they would not have had to
pay the same tax at the same time under realization. That many would
have to pay the tax anyway, 76 and that the present values of the tax
payments under a mark-to-market system and under realization could
be made equal for many taxpayers 77 is likely to carry little rhetorical
weight. Sadly, I see no real likelihood that a mark-to-market regime that,
applied to a broad class of individual taxpayers, even one that applied
only to publicly traded stocks and securities and their derivative
products, will be a vehicle for making substantial improvements in our
income tax system.

75Professor

Shaviro has discussed the effect of "cognitive biases" on tax reform. Among
other things, Professor Shaviro points out, it is quite clear that people want "to pay as little
tax as possible while receiving as much value from government services as possible."
Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the Legislative Process as
Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 57-64 (1990). However,
individuals have difficulty evaluating what they receive in government services, so they
generally evaluate their welfare based on how much tax they pay. See id. Moreover, they
tend to be bad judges of how much tax they pay, both in a relative and an absolute sense.
See id.
76 Those who hold interests in mutual funds often do not get the full benefits of realization
because of the funds engage in trading. On the other hand, some taxpayers can defer
realization until death, in which case they likely would pay more tax under a mark-tomarket regime.
77 Professor Weisbach recommends that mark-to-market gains and losses be subject to a
nominal rate that is equal to the effective rate of tax on income from assets under
realization. In other words, mark-to-market income would be taxed at a lower rate than
gains under realization. See Weisbach, supra note 6, at 100.
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But does this mean that a partial mark-to-market proposal has to be
taken off the table completely? I think not. Although policy makers do
not have much of an appetite for abstract improvements in the tax
system, they are able to stomach changes that target "abusive" behavior.
Even when Congressmen vehemently decry tax increases, they find
themselves voting for provisions that increase someone's taxes; it does
not seem to matter much as long as the provisions are dressed in antiabuse rhetoric. Recent years have seen a number of times when
members of the Senate Finance Committee and House Committee on
Ways and Means have joined forces with the Department of Treasury to
introduce pieces of legislation aimed at specific, putatively abusive,
behavior. 78 Somehow, these provisions do not seem to qualify as tax
increases, as if tax increases and anti-abuse measures were mutually
exclusive terms.
Could this phenomenon be harnessed to actually improve the tax
system by adopting some form of partial mark-to-market? I believe it is
only a matter of finding the right approach. There is no question that
anxiety runs high about the use of financial products to obtain untoward
tax results. If a mark-to-market regime believably targeted these abuses,
it would have a shot.
Perhaps we could find a way to limit the application of a mark-tomarket regime to corporations, certain partnerships and wealthy or highincome individuals.
Or perhaps the regime could apply only to
taxpayers who engage in certain kinds of transactions.
Another

78See, e.g., Archer Pulls Plug on Exploitation of Section 357(c) Ambiguities, TAX NOTES TODAY
202-2, Oct. 20, 1998, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT file (describing anti-abuse
legislation introduced by House Committee on Ways and Means Chairman Archer (RTexas) that was precipitated by a Clinton administration proposal); Chief Taxwriters Would
Kill Tax-Free Distributionof REIT LiquidationsTo C Corps, TAX NOTES TODAY 100-1, May 26,
1998, availablein LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT file (describing joint introduction by chairmen
of the House Committee on Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committee of legislation
to eliminate a perceived abuse of a tax provision); Tax Chairs Offer Stapled REIT Bill, TAX
NOTES TODAY 59-1, Mar. 27, 1998, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT file (describing
similar action by committee chairmen); ABA Tax Section Meeting: Treasury's Kohl Wants
More Help From the PractitionerCommunity, TAX NOTES TODAY 99-11, May 22, 1995, available
in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT file (noting "current willingness of the taxwriting
committees, their staffs, and the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation to consider quick
legislative fixes to inappropriate or unintended applications of the code"). Professor
Shaviro observed this preference even in the Tax Reform Act of 1986, a piece of legislation
touted for its tax policy achievements. The legislation, he says, had a tendency, "magnified
at each stage of the legislative process, to address perceptions of abuse through selective
limitations at the expense of ... base broadening. See Shaviro, supra note 73, at 51.
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approach would be to give taxpayers more opportunities to elect a markto-market method of accounting for publicly traded stocks and securities
and their derivatives and give them incentives to make the election. We
may already be taking steps in that direction' 9
In any event, there may be creative ways to take individuals out of
the mark-to-market picture 8° and focus instead on the types of taxpayers
and transactions that generate the lion's share of the problems with
realization:
large corporations and high income or net-worth
individuals. While such an approach may not be entirely satisfying from
a policy perspective, neither is partial mark-to-market. The question is
whether an even more limited partial mark-to-market system would
make an incremental improvement in the taxation of financial
instruments. I believe that it would, although I am sure that a real-world
application of such a regime would have some surprising results. 8'
Nonetheless, if we are going to propose something as practical as saving
the income tax, why not come up with a plan that can be enacted?

79In

1997, the tax law was modified to allow securities and commodities traders to elect

mark-to-market accounting for securities and commodities. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997,
Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 1001(b) reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 788, 906-07 (codified as I.R.C.
§ 475(0). One reason a taxpayer might elect to use this method is to avoid the rules that
limit losses on certain financial transactions, such as the wash sale rules of I.R.C. § 1091 and
the straddle rules of I.R.C. § 1092, which are onerous for active securities and commodities
traders. Cf. Letter from Leon M. Metzger, Paloma Partners Company LLC, to Donald C.
Lubick, Department of the Treasury (Feb. 11, 1999) reprinted in TAX NOTES TODAY 37-33,
Feb. 25,1999, availablein LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT file.
Another example of this possible trend is the "constructive ownership" proposal
contained in the Administration's most recent budget submission. Taxpayers could avoid
certain undesirable tax results under this provision by electing to mark certain financial
instruments and derivatives to market. See DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL
EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMNISNTRATON's REVENUE PROPOSALS 123 (Feb. 1999) reprinted in
123 DAILY TAX REPORT, Feb. 2,1999, Text Supp. No. L-32.
80 Individuals may not need to be completely shielded from the mark-to-market method.
For example, many mutual fund shareholders might be indifferent to whether their mutual
fund was required to use mark-to-market accounting.
81As an example, few anticipated how useful the mark-to-market accounting method
would be to securities dealers in allowing them to become intermediaries for tax shelters.
This limited mark-to-market regime "allows securities dealers to serve as tax owners
without suffering liability, and permits their customers unintended benefits of our
realization-based system." Miller, supra note 57, at 342.
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